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DISCOUNTING PROPERTY VALUES AT DEATH
— by Neil E. Harl*
 The idea that property values can be discounted at death
for a minority interest and for non-marketability is well
established.1  Although discounting cannot be applied in
addition to any reduction in value from special use valuation
of land,2 discounting of corporate stock may produce a
lower stock value than claiming special use valuation on the
corporation -owned land.3
Discounting for co-ownership
More than a decade ago, it was well settled that interests
in real estate held as community property were eligible for a
discount for non-marketability of the decedent's fractional
interest in the land.4  However, in several Tax Court cases,
undivided interests in tenancy in common were ineligible for
a discount.5  But a number of recent Tax Court decisions
have allowed discounting.  In one 1989 case,6 a 12-1/2
percent discount was allowed for a tenancy in common
ownership interest.  In another 1989 decision, the decedent's
20 percent interest in farmland was discounted a total of 40
percent for minority interest and for restrictions on
transferability.7  A 1992 case allowed a discount of 15
percent for undivided interests (77 percent and 50 percent )
in real estate.8  Another Tax Court case, also in 1989,
allowed a discount on land value of 25 percent to reflect a
partnership's undivided one-half interest with the resulting
value multiplied by the decedent's percentage interest in the
partnership.9  A U.S. District Court also allowed a discount
for a tenancy in common interest in land.10
In a 1993 private letter ruling, IRS now insists that any
discount should be limited to the cost of partitioning the
property under state law.11
Discounting corporate stock
A discount for minority interest and for non-
marketability has been allowed for many closely held
corporations including farm and ranch corporations.1 2
Although the magnitude of the discount has varied widely, a
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discount in the range of 20 to 25 percent has been relatively
common.13
Quite significantly, IRS has now abandoned its
opposition to allowing a minority discount for federal gift
tax purposes where family members in the aggregate own a
majority interest.14
It is important to note that while a minority interest may
give rise to a discount, a majority interest may carry a
control premium.15
Continuing uncertainty
While discounting of both co-ownership interests and
corporate stock has been allowed in numerous cases,
uncertainty still exists over the size of the discount.  The
1993 attempt by IRS to limit the discount for co-ownership
interests to the costs of partitioning under state law could
bring a modicum of certainty to that area, but additional
cases and rulings are expected as taxpayers press for more
generous discounting along the lines of what has been
allowed in recent litigated cases.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 5 Harl, Agricultural Law § 43.02 (1993)
(discounting for a co-ownership of property); 8 Harl,
Agricultural Law § 58.05[2][c] (1993) (discounting of
corporate stock values).
2 Est. of Maddox v. Comm’r, 93 T.C. 228 (1989).  See Ltr.
Rul. 9119008, Jan. 31, 1991.
3 See ns. 12-15 infra.
4 Propstra v. U.S., 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982).  But see
Est. of Haydel v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1991-507 (no
discount allowed where pre-trial stipulation set values of
property interests).
5 Est. of Pudim v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1982-606; Est. of
Clapp v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1983-721; Est. of
McMullen v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1988-500 (value of
decedent's undivided one-half interest in trust property
not discounted as fractional share where trust property to
be sold as entire fee simple interest).
The next issue will be published on January 7, 1994
6 Est. of Youle v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1989-138. 7 Est. of Wildman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1989-667.
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*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
8 Est. of Pillsbury v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1992-425.
9 Est. of Feuchter v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1992-97.
10 Robinson v. U.S., 90-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 60,045 (S.D. Ga.
1990).
11 See Ltr. Rul. 9336002, May 28, 1993.
12 See, e.g., Est. of Andrews v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 938
(1982) (discount allowed for minority stock interest
for lack of control and marketability even though
rest of stock owned by siblings of decedent); Est. of
Lenheim v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1990-403
(discount allowed at death for minority interest
status and lack of marketability).  But see Est. of
O'Connell v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1978-191, aff'd,
640 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1981) (ranch stock valued at
net asset value of underlying property; court did not
allow discount for mon-marketabiltity).
13 Est. of Lenheim v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1990-403
(discount of 20 percent); Est. of Murphy v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1990-472 (20 percent
discount allowed for non-marketability and state
law restricting liquidation).  See also Est. of Berg v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1991-279, aff'd on these
issues, 92-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 60,117 (8th Cir. 1992)
(estate entitled to 20 percent minority discount and
10 percent for lack of marketability for 26.9 percent
ownership in closely held corporation).
14 Rev. Rul. 93-12, I.R.B. 1993-7, revoking Rev. Rul.
81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187 (no minority discount for
gift tax purposes for value of one-third interest in
closely held corporations transferred to each of
three children).
15 Est. of Salsbury v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1975-333
(38.1 percent control premium for 51.8 percent of
stock).  But see Est. of Bright v. Comm’r, 658 F.2d
999 (5th Cir. 1981) (no control premium where
decedent's undivided one-half community property
interest in control block of stock was effectively
severed into two minority interests at death; family
attribution rules not applicable).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSES-ALM § 1.01[1].* The plaintiff was injured
while riding a horse owned by the defendants on land
owned by the defendants. The plaintiff was thrown from the
horse when the horse suddenly bolted. The plaintiff alleged
that the defendants failed to warn about the horse’s
dangerous propensities. The court upheld a directed verdict
for the defendant because the plaintiff failed to provide any
evidence of the horse’s propensity to throw its rider. Mason
v. Komlo, 621 N.E.2d 716 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL
ESTATE PROPERTY-ALM § 13.03[3].*  Within 180
days after the debtor filed bankruptcy, the debtor's aunt died
leaving the debtor a bequest of real and personal property.
The estate was not admitted to probate until after 180 days
following the bankruptcy petition and the debtor argued that
under state law, the debtor was not entitled to the bequests
until after the will was admitted to probate.  The court held
that the bequests were estate property because under state
law the title to the property passed under the will upon the
death of the decedent, with confirmation upon admission of
the will to probate.  In re Chenoweth, 3 F.3d 1111 (7th
Cir. 1993), aff’g, 143 B.R. 527 (S.D. Ill. 1992), aff'g, 132
B.R. 161 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03[3].*
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  The debtors claimed a
homestead exemption for a 1.1 acre homestead. A creditor
had obtained a judgment lien against the property and 106
acres of farmland and the debtor sought to avoid the lien as
impairing the homestead exemption and as unsecured as to
the farmland. The court held that although Ohio law
allowed attachment of judgment liens against homesteads
only upon sale or execution, the lien could be avoided as
impairing the bankruptcy exemption, even where the
homestead was not going to be sold. The court also held
that although the lien was completely unsecured as to the
farmland, the lien would be allowed to remain in effect until
the land was sold in foreclosure, in case any equity arose
from the sale. In re Mershman, 158 B.R. 698 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1993).
In 1988 through 1990, the debtors lived in a residence
for which the debtors purchased building materials for
improvements to the home. The debtors had not paid for the
materials and the supplier filed a claim in the debtors’
January 1993 bankruptcy case. In October 1990, the debtors
changed residences and claimed a homestead exemption for
the second residence in the bankruptcy case. The supplier
obtained a judgment for the unpaid materials and filed a lien
against the debtors’ homestead. The debtors sought
avoidance of the lien as impairing their homestead
exemption. The court held that because the claim arose
prior to the debtors’ acquisition of the exempt homestead,
the claim could not be avoided; however, because the claim
was against the husband only, the claim could be avoided.
In re Streeper, 158 B.R. 783 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1993).
HOMESTEAD. The court held that the debtors could
claim a homestead exemption under Mo. Rev. Stat. §
513.475, for a residence purchased by the debtors under a
contract for deed. In re Galvin, 158 B.R. 806 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1993).
The court held that the debtor could claim a homestead
exemption for a mobile home under Fla. Stat. § 222.05. In
re Meola, 158 B.R. 881 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
